Standing Committee A

[Mr. Win Griffiths in the Chair]

Police Reform Bill [Lords]

Clause 28 - Resignation in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Norman Baker: Mr. Davies—

Win Griffiths: Mr. Griffiths.

Norman Baker: That is a confident start to this afternoon's proceedings. Without apportioning blame, hon. Members behind me assured me that your name was Mr. Davies. However, I knew that you were not Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Griffiths, and I certainly knew that you were not Miss Widdecombe, so I was struggling. My apologies.
 I want to explore one or two issues with the Minister, especially the phrase ''or to resign'', which is a significant difference between the Bill and the Police Act 1996. What is the meaning behind the phrase, both in its powers and its implications for officers who may be subject to the provision? I stand to be corrected, but there may be a distinction without a difference. For example, if an officer is required to leave the force, he is required to leave the force. Whether such action is called resignation or retirement seems of little consequence, unless the pension arrangements are altered for the officer. I know that the Government are keen to ensure that police officers do not leave the force for suspicious reasons, in that they leave the force before they are subject to proceedings, but benefit from the pension arrangements. Is that the reason behind the words ''or to resign''? If so, will pension arrangements be altered accordingly? 
 There is a curious use of language in the words ''to resign''. I do not know whether it is an active or a passive verb, as in the case of the former Transport Secretary who recently departed from his post. Is ''I am resigned'' correct English or should it be that he was resigned by the Prime Minister? Is it a gentle way in which to say that someone had been sacked? If an officer were not behaving appropriately or in accordance with his duty, it is more honest to say that he was dismissed, not asked ''to resign''. If police officers want to resign, it should be something that they can do of their own volition, without interference from the police authority or the Home Secretary. I seek clarification of whether there is a distinction between retire and resign. Where does that leave dismissal?

John Denham: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths. In answer to the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker), there is a material difference between resign and retire and that centres on the financial provision that would be made
 for the officer who resigns, as opposed to the officer who retires.
 I shall explain briefly why the provision is necessary. When a chief officer is called on to step down—to introduce a new phrase into the debate—in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness, it can be only by retirement. Historically, when the legislation was originally drafted, it was probably a reasonable presumption that most officers would reach the rank of chief constable at some point in their 50s when, if they were likely to cease being a chief constable, they would be likely to retire from the police service. It is much more the case now that officers reach the rank of chief constable well before the usual retirement age. The new chief constable of Thames Valley is in his early 40s, and that position is becoming increasingly common. That means that there would be officers for whom the requirement to resign would be more appropriate than the requirement to retire. 
 Certainly, if an officer were to resign rather than retire, different financial arrangements would have to be made. In particular, there would be a need to make appropriate arrangements for severance pay, as it would not necessarily be appropriate to kick into full pension provision at the age of 42 or 43, for example. We have made a commitment to the Chief Police Officers Staff Association that we will set out clear arrangements and regulations for the type of severance pay and provision that should be made. Obviously, that will need to be discussed with CPOSA as it is the appropriate representative of chief constables.

Nick Hawkins: As the Minister is well aware, the issue of severance, the amount of pay and the difference between pay on resignation and retirement has been a vexed question in many police authorities. Does he anticipate that he will be able to give members of the Committee at least a draft of the kind of arrangements that he has in mind to include under regulations before the Bill finishes its passage through the House? That would be of great interest to members of the Committee because of the controversies on the subject.

John Denham: The hon. Gentleman asks a reasonable question, but the honest answer is that I shall have to disappoint him. We are not sufficiently far advanced in our discussions on the issue to promise that we will be able to produce draft arrangements before the middle of July if the Bill pursues a smooth course through the Commons and the Lords. I repeat the commitment that we gave in writing to the CPOSA that we would discuss the issues with it. I understand that the expression ''requirement to resign'' has been used as an alternative to the term ''dismissal'' in police regulations for many years. It is custom and practice, apparently, to use that phrase, and we carried on using it in the Bill.
 If that is the substantive issue of the clause stand part debate, I shall not further detain the Committee. Perhaps under one of the later clauses there will be an opportunity for me to set out the sum total of the differences between the existing procedures that can lead to the stepping down of a chief constable and those that we are bringing into place.

Nick Hawkins: I join in welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths. I also welcome the Minister back. The welcome from the Opposition Benches is probably as nothing compared with the welcome given to him by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Coventry, North-East (Mr. Ainsworth). In the Minister's absence, in a very good natured debate on Thursday afternoon, the Under-Secretary was regretting the fact that he might have volunteered too much and was getting into subjects that he never anticipated getting into. I am sure that both the Minister and the Under-Secretary are relieved.
 More seriously, I am grateful to the Minister for what he said in response to my intervention, but he may be a little over-optimistic in assuming that the Bill will have an entirely smooth passage. As he knows, we shall come to some controversial issues. Does the Minister think that if by some mischance the passage of the Bill were delayed and it did not finish its parliamentary stages until the autumn, it would be possible for hon. Members to have a little more idea about how the negotiations were going, and about what financial arrangements were anticipated for retirement as opposed to resignation, or vice versa? 
 It is sometimes a little dangerous for the Government to say, ''It'll all be fine; we'll work it out in negotiations, and it'll come right under subsequent regulations.'' That applies not only to this Bill but to many others. It might turn out that controversial matters cannot be debated fully in the context of a statutory instrument that introduces subsequent regulations. If the Government propose significant new material negotiated between them and the various police staff bodies, members of the Committee would find it very helpful to have it. Perhaps it is appropriate to put that on the record.

John Denham: Obviously, I shall be as helpful as I can. I shall expand on what I said earlier. Because the provisions affect pay and pensions, there is a statutory framework for negotiations that involves the police negotiating body and the police advisory board. I do not wish to raise expectations that we will have completed that work—or even have substantially advanced it—by the autumn, but I am happy to give the commitment that I will share with the opposition parties whatever information is available during the progress of the Bill.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 - Procedural requirements for removal of

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 257, in page 29, line 4, at end insert—
'(1A) After subsection (2) of section 9E of the 1996 Act there shall be inserted— 
 ''(2AA) Where representations are made under this section, the Metropolitan Police Authority shall, where it proposes to exercise the power mentioned in subsection (1), appoint one or more persons (one at least of whom shall be a person who is not an officer of police or of a government department) to hold an inquiry into the reasons 
for the exercise of the power and report to it and shall consider any report made under this subsection.''.'.

Win Griffiths: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 258, in page 29, line 14, at end insert—
'(2A) After subsection (3) of section 11 of the 1996 Act there shall be inserted— 
 ''(3AA) Where representations are made under this section, the police authority shall, where it proposes to exercise the power mentioned in subsection (2), appoint one or more persons (one at least of whom shall be a person who is not an officer of police or of a government department) to hold an inquiry into the reasons for the exercise of the power and report to it and shall consider any report made under this subsection.''.'.
 No. 252, in clause 30, page 29, line 39, at end insert— 
'(1A) After subsection (2) of section 9E of the 1996 Act there shall be inserted— 
 ''(2B) Where the Metropolitan Police Authority has exercised its power under paragraph (a) of subsection (2A) the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis may make representations to the members appointed under subsection (2AA) concerning the continuance or cessation of that suspension and the members shall have a duty to consider those representations and to make recommendations concerning its continuance or cessation to the police authority which shall consider the recommendations made.''.'.
 No. 255, in clause 30, page 30, line 15, at end insert— 
'(2A) After subsection (3) of section 11 of the 1996 Act there shall be inserted— 
 ''(3B) Where the police authority has exercised its power under subsection (a) the Chief Constable may make representations to the members appointed under subsection (3AA) concerning the continuance or cessation of that suspension and the members shall have a duty to consider those representations and to make recommendations concerning its continuance or cessation to the police authority which shall consider the recommendations made.''.'.

Norman Baker: The amendment stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Mrs. Brooke), who is on parliamentary business elsewhere this afternoon. Amendments Nos. 257 and 258 seek to insert into clause 29 an overtly independent element with regard to considerations of whether it is appropriate to take action to remove a senior officer.
 As the Minister will be aware, the wording of those amendments closely mirrors section 42 of the Police Act 1996, which relates to the Secretary of State's powers. These amendments relate to the police authority's powers, but it seems appropriate to us that these provisions should be explicitly set out here. 
 I am sure that the Minister recognises that the removal of senior officers is not a step to be taken lightly. It is also a step that must be seen to be fair and just, so that—hopefully—it commands support not only within the police force, but within the police authority, the wider public and the media. 
 It is unhelpful and damaging if the removal of an officer is surrounded by controversy, as was the case with regard to the removal of the previous chief constable of Sussex. That was unhelpful to the Government and the police force in Sussex, as well as to the holder of the post, Mr. Paul Whitehouse. To be seen to be fair, it is important to write into the Bill the safeguard—as I would describe it—which was present in relation to the Secretary of State's powers in 
 the 1996 Act, for the presence of at least one person who is not an officer of police or a Government Department to be party to an inquiry into the reasons for the removal of an officer. 
 We have inserted an extra phrase: 
''the reasons for the exercise of the power''.
 That is not intended to make it more difficult to remove an officer who is not acting with efficiency or effectiveness, or in the interests of the force. It is intended to ensure that the process is seen to be fair and just, because if that is the case, if the conclusion is that that officer should go, that is more likely to command public support. Amendments Nos. 252 and 255 are largely consequential on those amendments. 
 The Minister may be able to give me an assurance, or point to somewhere in the Bill that I have not found that provides the safeguards that I am trying to insert. However, I hope that he takes on board that it is important to have that independent element, for the sake of justice and the public perception with regard to such matters.

Nick Hawkins: The Opposition support the spirit of the comments of the hon. Member for Lewes, and we will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.
 In the next group of amendments, which my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice) will be dealing with, we have raised the same kind of issue about the making of representations. Perhaps we will have a slightly wider debate when we address them. It is fair to say that, when the Bill was first drafted, my hon. Friend tried to find ways of incorporating this concept into amendments. We were advised that the type of amendments that we were considering would not be in order, because of existing legislation in the 1996 Act. 
 The hon. Member for Lewes has found another way of introducing precisely the type of concepts that interest us, and we will listen with interest for the assurances offered by the Minister. These matters are serious because of the reasons given by the hon. Member for Lewes and recent controversies in Sussex and other forces. Whenever such serious steps are contemplated, an inquiry would be helpful. Certainly, representations would need to be made. Something along the lines of—if not precisely—the amendment should be in the Bill, given that so much of it amends the 1996 Act. When that Act is being amended, something along the lines of the amendment should be included in the Bill.

John Denham: I can understand the Opposition's arguments. Indeed, I have discussed such issues with the Chief Police Officers Staff Association, which has been active in pushing them. However, I ask the Committee to resist the amendments.
 By way of broad background—I stress that I do not refer to any named case—over a 20-year period, chief officers have occasionally ended their careers earlier than might have been expected, but without the use of the provisions laid down in law for their retirement. They have retired from their posts in some other way. 
 That is not necessarily a satisfactory state of affairs. We should have ways of dealing with such matters properly. Those ways should be seen to be fair to everyone involved, but not present the sort of difficulties in the practical use of the powers that another route has used to the same end. One danger of requiring in the Bill the establishment of an inquiry is that it makes the existing powers, which have been in force since 1964, more difficult to use at local level. 
 It is important to stress to the Committee that the powers available to the police authority are not new or being introduced by the legislation, except for the change about resignation rather than retirement that we discussed earlier. They are powers that have been in primary legislation since 1964. Despite the many occasions on which the legislation has been examined since then, nobody has previously thought it necessary to include the requirement to hold an inquiry in the Bill. 
 In framing the legislation, we have looked for improvements that we think have been omitted in the past and put them in. Such things may have been past practice, but have not been included in Bills. In contrast to what has been done previously, for example, in clause 29 we have placed a new responsibility on the police authority, should it wish to take action, to set out fully its reasons for so doing. It must give reasons as well as consider any representations—as under existing law. There is another new requirement: the officer must have a chance to make representations in person. 
 The two new provisions relating to representation and the giving of reasons have not existed in the law since 1964—we have built them in. It is worth remembering that we have retained the existing constitutional safeguard, which is that the action of the police authority continues to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, as it has been since the 1964 Act. 
 I judge that there are sufficient existing safeguards. Police authorities must consider representations and secure the Secretary of State's approval. The new requirements that we have introduced are for authorities to give grounds for their actions and for officers concerned to be offered a personal hearing. Put together, they provide reasonable additional safeguards in the Bill since the original drafting in 1964, but do not overload the procedures with specific requirements that would make the power difficult to use in practice.

Norman Baker: Two issues arise from what the Minister said. I am not clear why the inquiry process is appropriate for the Secretary of State's initiative but not that of the police authority. If officers have retired earlier than they might have otherwise—or another gentle phrase that the Minister used—surely putting in place a system in which officers have more confidence suggests that they will stay and go through the process rather than taking the action that the Minister wishes to avoid.

John Denham: On the latter point, the difficulty has been that people on the employer side have been
 unwilling to initiate procedures, rather than people dropping out as the procedure progresses.
 The difference is very clear on the hon. Gentleman's first point. If the Secretary of State, rather than the police authority, required action to be taken, he would not have a person to oversee his decision. It would be necessary for the Secretary of State to be advised by an inquiry. If the police authority decides to initiate action, the Secretary of State will provide the second look at the facts of the matter. In a case initiated by the police authority, the Secretary of State is the long stop or second opinion. If the Secretary of State initiates the process, it is right that he needs a process set down for he or she to be advised through an inquiry.

Nick Hawkins: I understand the distinction that the Minister is drawing between the two circumstances. However, there could be a case in which the perception of a police authority was that it was dominated by representatives of a political party that happened to be the same party that formed the Government and was, therefore, the Secretary of State's party. Does the Minister accept that there might be worries if it were thought that political issues—with a small ''p'' and capital ''P''—were involved in the departure of a chief police officer? It might be wiser to have an independent inquiry into what had gone on in such circumstances because, otherwise, one political party would dominate both arms of the second look?

John Denham: We need to keep a sense of perspective on the whole procedure. A case in which anyone envisages it necessary to remove a chief constable will be rare. I referred to a few examples over the past 20 years when chief constables have finished their careers earlier than might be expected, but there are not a huge number of cases and we cannot be entirely certain about what happened in each case. Saying that we must build in an inquiry procedure in case of the exceptional circumstances or concurrence of events that the hon. Gentleman suggests has the danger of overloading the procedure and making it too bureaucratic.
 I met the chief constable of Gloucestershire police last week and discussed these issues. The Government have agreed to develop guidance with CPOSA on the way in which police authorities should conduct the procedure. That is a better way forward. It allows us flexibility and the ability to set out further detail than we would want to include in the Bill. I cannot speak for CPOSA, but I am sure that it would prefer such statutory provision. It welcomes that approach and we should develop fuller guidance that police authorities would find useful through discussion with CPOSA. The range of circumstances that might confront a police authority will vary from rare circumstance to rare circumstance.

Norman Baker: I am grateful to the Minister for responding fully to my initial points and to interventions from me and from the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins). I am pleased that he has discussed the matter with the chief constable of Gloucestershire and that he recognises that there is an
 issue, even if he feels that the amendment is not the appropriate way in which to deal with it. Guidance would be better than the absence of guidance, and I hope that the Minister will progress with that and listen carefully to chief officers' views on the important issue. An independent element is appropriate. It seems difficult to argue against that. It would be a safeguard that everyone would understand, and I am sorry that the Minister—

Vera Baird: In our previous sitting, the hon. Members for Lewes and for Surrey Heath were 1,000 per cent. in favour of devolved decision making to that local leg of the tripartite arrangement. What has changed in the past week?

Norman Baker: Nothing. Independent elements at a local level would obviate the need for the Secretary of State to be a check on what that leg of the tripod was doing.
 The hon. Member for Surrey Heath made a point about the presence of the same political party locally and nationally. Although that may sound far-fetched in many circumstances, it is possible that, when a police authority has acted in an especially provocative and overtly political way, if the Secretary of State is of the same party, he or she might find it difficult to countermand that and risk a series of ''Tory split'' or ''Labour split'' headlines in the newspapers. Although that is unlikely, it cannot be discounted. The presence of an independent element would help preserve us against that.

Lady Hermon: I apologise for the confusion at the beginning of the debate. It may help the hon. Member for Lewes to know that, in Northern Ireland, when a senior officer is retired by the Policing Board or the Secretary of State, provision is made not only for representations to be made but for a requirement, which is an obligation in such circumstances, for persons appointed to hold an inquiry and report before the person has retired.

Norman Baker: I am grateful for that intervention, as it gave me information that I did not have. I do not know whether the Minister was aware of that. Clearly, from what we have been told, in Northern Ireland, independence in input has been seen to be worth having. I imagine that it is also considered fairer and more just to hold such an inquiry.
 I shall not labour the point. The Minister has said that he will pursue the matter in respect of guidance. He recognises that an issue is involved, even if he is not happy with the exact form of the amendments. Accordingly, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 91, in page 29, line 14, at end insert
'accompanied by a professional adviser if he or she should so wish.'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 92, in clause 31, page 31, line 38, at end insert
'either in person or in writing, or by another person on his behalf'.

James Paice: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths.
 The amendments follow the same theme as the previous group inasmuch as they relate to ensuring fairness for a chief officer on whom the powers in these clauses may be used, whether by the authority or, in the case of amendment No. 92, the Secretary of State. There seems to be an element of inconsistency in relation to not only the inquiry but the form of representation. 
 I carefully read the copious document that the Minister kindly sent Committee members, which represents the 1996 Act as it would be amended if the Bill were enacted in its original form. I understand that, under section 42 of the 1996 Act as it will be amended, the inquiry remains in place, but the representations that the Secretary of State will need to consider in the amended form will give that officer an opportunity to make representations to the Secretary of State. Amendment No. 92 should be made in order to allow such representations to be made in person or in writing. The reference to making representations is not sufficiently explicit. 
 The Minister may say that an inquiry will be held, and it is clear that the inquiry will take representations, too. However, I argue that the Secretary of State should allow the individual to make representations, either in person or in writing—the choice would probably be to do so in person—before the inquiry stage is reached, because that may circumvent the need for an inquiry and therefore curtail the whole case. 
 That seems perfectly reasonable, and I am sure that the Minister is right to say that the powers will be used rarely, so I do not think that he can plead that it would be an onerous duty on the Secretary of State to see the chief officer in relation to whom he intends to exercise the powers. Amendment No. 92, which would allow representations to be made in person or in writing, is therefore appropriate. 
 Amendment No. 91 addresses the question of where the authority uses the powers, and representations in that respect. It is reasonable that, when using the right to make representations, the chief officer should, if he or she wishes, be accompanied by a professional adviser. Having studied the provision again, I realise that the amendment should also apply to line 4 of page 29, but never mind. We can correct that later if the Minister is minded to accept the principle of the proposal, which is straightforward. The chief officer should be able to have professional advice when making representations if the authority plans to exercise the powers given to it in the clause. 
 These straightforward amendments are designed simply to provide a little more fairness for the chief officer or openness about the procedure. I hope that the Minister will accept the spirit behind them, if not the amendments themselves. I stress that this is simply a matter of equity. On amendment No. 92, the need for the inquiry might be short-circuited if the chief officer could make representations in person to the Secretary of State before he decided whether to go 
 ahead and use the inquiry procedure laid down in section 42(3) of the 1996 Act.

Norman Baker: I rise simply to add my support to the amendments. On amendment No. 91, it is important for a chief officer in the position described to have a fair hearing. They will be under pressure and, as a result, may not react in terms of representations as cleanly or effectively as they would usually. Therefore the presence of a professional adviser would be only fair. Indeed, it is not unusual in trade union or other management disputes for such a person to be present, so the proposal seems reasonably uncontroversial, but perhaps the Minister will persuade me otherwise. The flexibility that amendment No. 92 would provide also seems only fair and reasonable, so I hope that he will look favourably on the amendments.

John Denham: I shall deal first with amendment No. 91. Obviously I have some sympathy with the view that, in practice, someone might well wish to be represented or accompanied by a representative from their staff association, for example. However, we are not keen on putting a right to that representation in the Bill, because we do not want to create a legal framework so rigid that it becomes a mechanism for delaying hearings through one device or another or for making hearings overly legalistic.
 As I said, we understand the argument that someone might well wish to be represented, but rather than make that an explicit requirement in the Bill, we are happy to discuss it with the CPOSA, as I said previously, and if necessary make regulations under clause 33. We will certainly ensure that there is adequate and appropriate guidance.

Norman Baker: The Minister appears to be saying that he accepts the spirit of the amendment, but will not accept the amendment. With respect, it is not mechanistic. It includes the phrase
''if he or she should so wish.''
 That gives the flexibility to which the Minister refers.

John Denham: We need to avoid the creation of a right that legal advisers or others could use to make themselves unavailable to attend an inquiry as a representative in order to drag out the proceedings and make them unduly legalistic. We are building on provisions that are unchanged since 1964, and we should recognise that the right to representation is being included for the first time. It may be possible to include in regulations under clause 33 the question of someone being accompanied by their staff association representative or adviser through the discussions that we promised with the CPOSA. It is not uncommon for Ministers to acknowledge the spirit of an amendment, but to advise the Committee to resist it, and this may be one of those occasions.

James Paice: The Minister appears to imply that if the professional adviser, who may be a solicitor, is unavailable, the authority could say, ''Tough, we're still going ahead, and you can make a representation without your adviser.'' I understand that we do not want to delay the procedure, but the reverse is that the authority can proceed willy-nilly. I am even more tempted about the need to include that in the Bill, not
 that I have any doubts about the CPOSA or its enthusiasm for an alternative approach.

John Denham: I reassure the hon. Gentleman that we do not want the procedure to work in a way that is an abuse of the proper rights of a chief officer who, after all, faces serious consequences for his career. Equally, however, we do not want to set down a rigid legal framework that can be exploited by those who want to conduct affairs in a way that has nothing to do with a proper hearing and everything to do with delaying and frustrating the process. There has never been a demand for this change before, which is why my approach is appropriate.

Lady Hermon: In Northern Ireland, it was good enough for the chief constable or a senior officer to be given an opportunity to make representations under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. Section 35(4) contains the words:
''the Secretary of State shall . . . give the officer concerned an opportunity to make, either personally or otherwise, representations to him''.
 If that is good enough to have appeared in legislation in Northern Ireland, why is it unduly burdensome in the rest of the UK?

John Denham: I am not an expert on all aspects of the legislation, and would not pretend to be, especially to the hon. Lady who represents the constituency that she does. We all understand that things are done differently in Northern Ireland from the way in which they are done here. The Committee should remember that we are considering building new rights on top of procedures that have been laid down since 1964. Opposition Members did not seek to amend the 1994 or the 1996 legislation when they had the opportunity to do so and when the same issues came up for discussion. It is a matter of getting the balance of procedures right. The right way to deal with the more detailed handling of such matters by the police authority is to take advantage of guidance to police authorities and, if necessary, the provision for regulations. That is important as although these issues are rare, when they arise they attract immense attention and publicity, and they affect other officers and the morale of the force. The procedure should be seen to be fair to the officer involved and sufficiently rapid and flexible to deal with the important issue of efficiency or effectiveness in the force. In updating the legislation, we are trying to offer some comfort about the safeguards, none of which exist at present, without proposing a system that renders itself unusable by being overly dominated by procedures, with some of the consequences that have resulted in the past.

James Paice: I am slightly unclear what the Minister proposes. He clearly objects to the amendment but he used the term ''regulation'' a couple of times in his response. If he thinks that the matter could be covered in regulation it becomes part of legislation and in that respect is no different from it being in the Bill. If he is planning to include it in a code of guidance it is not legislation, but neither is it regulation. I am slightly unclear exactly what the Minister is saying. Of course, he is right to say that we do not want a matter to be
 delayed because procedures are used in a legalistic way, but at the same time the rights of the individual must be protected, as he said. I am not sure that a code of guidance would be adequate. I am not clear about the Minister's use of the word ''regulation''.

John Denham: I talked about regulation on each occasion in the context of ''if appropriate''. In many cases, guidance will be better than formal, legal regulations but the Bill is not the place to address procedural matters as it would make the measure unnecessarily restrictive or inflexible. It is a matter that we need to consider either for guidance or for regulations in future discussions.

Huw Irranca-Davies: Government Members will want reassurance that there will be an opportunity for representation. However, we are equally concerned that there should be nothing in the Bill that could lead to delay, because that would destroy public confidence in the process. The proposal is a step forward, therefore we do not want to put obstacles in its way, but we seek the Minister's assurance that some representation will be available.

John Denham: There certainly will be; there is an explicit right to make representation in person, which did not previously exist until addressing the police authority initiated the procedure. My hon. Friend is also right about the procedures striking the right balance. There is a value in having better guidance than is available at present. From my background work as a Minister on one or two cases, it is clear that police authorities that confront the situation often feel that they are starting from scratch in terms of having any idea about how they should proceed.
 Amendment No. 92 relates to the procedure in which the Secretary of State initiates action rather than the police authority.

Nick Hawkins: Before the Minister moves on, I want to raise a matter in the light of his response to interventions on the first amendment. He is aware that since the incorporation into our law of the Human Rights Act 1998 and with the existing powers with which Secretaries of State must comply in respect of judicial review, there are extra concerns. The Secretary of State has to certify, as he has done, that all the Bill's provisions comply with the Human Rights Act. Does the Minister not recognise that there might well be a concern about this measure bringing in new procedures if he does not allow a very informal new right to have professional advisers if the person involved should so wish. What we are proposing is hardly rigid or mechanistic; it might be easier for the Secretary of State to be defended against judicial review and make it much clearer if it was on the face of the Bill that it complies with the Human Rights Act.

John Denham: I obviously discussed similar issues with my advisers in the early drafting of the Bill. I am assured that the Bill is perfectly compatible with the Human Rights Act. I cannot remember whether the Home Secretary or I signed the necessary declaration. It is worth noting that the Joint Committee on Human Rights of both Houses also concluded that it was unlikely that the provisions of part 3 of the Bill would
 be held to engage rights under article 6.1 of the European convention on human rights. Although I acknowledge the hon. Gentleman's point and, indeed, I have raised it myself in the past, we seem to be on safe ground here.
 Amendment No. 92 addresses the situation where the Secretary of State initiates the process. Let us remember that clause 31 introduces a new requirement that the Secretary of State must give notice of his intentions with his reasons. Under existing legislation the chief officer must be given an opportunity to make representations, so that remains. If the Secretary of State proceeds he must, as at present, appoint an inquiry. When there is an inquiry the officer has a new right to make representations in person to that inquiry. 
 The central issue that is raised by the hon. Gentleman's amendment is whether, when the Secretary of State is deciding whether to proceed to an inquiry, he should hold an oral hearing with the chief officer rather than receive representations either in person or in writing. I can understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but we are in danger of duplicating oral hearings, one of which would have to happen in front of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State decides to proceed to an inquiry—having got as far as saying that issues need to be looked at, that is likely although not certain—the inquiry would have to go through the whole procedure too. If there is sufficient to dissuade the Secretary of State from proceeding and going to inquiries, it should be possible to set that out in the written representations to him, rather than having to have two oral inquiries. Therefore again, in the interests of not overcomplicating matters, I must reject the amendment as inappropriate.

James Paice: I follow the Minister's reasoning, but I am now slightly puzzled. The terminology used in the legislation, as it will be, is identical for the Secretary of State and the inquiry. Under the futuristic and amended version of the 1996 Act, before requiring the exercise of these powers the Secretary of State shall:
''give the officer concerned an opportunity to make representations to the Secretary of State''.
 It later states: 
''The Secretary of State shall consider any representations made to him under subsection (2)''.
 Then—this is unchanged from the original legislation and I recognise the correctness of the Minister's argument that we are on to fresh ground anyway—it states that at an inquiry held under subsection (3) the officer in question 
''shall be entitled to make representations to the inquiry''.
 We still have the phrase ''make representations''. The Minister clearly referred to the inquiry being an oral hearing. I am not sure why the phrase ''make representations'' in one context is an oral hearing, yet not in another.

Vera Baird: I think that it is explained in new subsection (3B) of the updated section 42, which states:
''The entitlement . . . to make representations shall include the entitlement to make them in person''.
 That must presuppose an oral hearing. That is the part that was missing.

James Paice: I am more than happy to have things explained to me, and if the hon. and learned Lady is right, I am happy to accept her interpretation. The Minister will probably endorse what she has just said, but I still question the need to go down the road of a full-blown inquiry. I hope that any such inquiry will be a comprehensive investigation, not a few minutes of an oral hearing. The opportunity for the chief officer, in the rare event of this happening, to have half an hour with the Secretary of State would be perfectly reasonable.
 I do not know whether the Minister wants to intervene, but otherwise I shall have to do something.

John Denham: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking this spontaneous intervention and to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), who is entirely forgiven for being a lawyer because she is correct. The entitlement for the chief officer to make representations in person to the Secretary of State is included. That is new, which is the difference.
 The sequence of events that could emerge from amendment No. 92 is that the Secretary of State has an oral hearing and then goes to inquiry, which itself then has an oral hearing. The Secretary of State would then receive the report of both oral hearings, which would not be best for decision making. Such a process would include duplication, and it should be possible for the Secretary of State to make the judgment about whether there is sufficient reason to go ahead with an inquiry on the basis of written representations.

James Paice: I thank the Minister for his intervention and for the information from the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, which put me right on one point. I do not entirely agree with the Minister about the concept of duplication; I see it more as a way of preventing the full sequence of events taking place. However, I shall not overdo the argument, as we have much more to do this evening. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 - Suspension of senior officers

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 250, in page 29, line 24, leave out 'proposal' and insert
'degree of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to consider the following amendments: No. 251, in page 29, line 30, after 'proposal', insert
'and the degree of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness'.
 No. 256, in clause 31, page 31, line 8, after 'necessary', insert 
'in the light of the degree of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness'.

Norman Baker: The amendments would ensure that any suspension is based on the
''degree of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness''
 and no other reason. The Minister will recognise that the power to suspend is serious and will lead in many cases to the termination of the employment of a chief constable or the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, depending on the case. It is questionable whether a power of suspension is needed to deal with what are essentially management or personnel matters. They are distinct from disciplinary or conduct issues, for which there is already a power to suspend if, for example, a chief constable is investigated for alleged disciplinary offences or a sufficiently serious crime. 
 The issue is not whether suspension is appropriate, but whether the grounds for suspension should be extended—as the Bill does—on the grounds of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness. I have some concerns about that, as the power could be somewhat draconian. It also questions the criteria that are used to decide whether a chief constable's actions constitute ineffectiveness. Would it be ineffective if, for example, a chief constable did not employ community support officers when neighbouring forces were doing so and the Home Office's police standards unit had decided that it was appropriate? Notwithstanding the Minister's previous promise that chief constables would not be compelled to do so, could such a decision be interpreted as ineffectiveness? If so, it would merit suspension. 
 The extension of the power is not a solitary measure: it must be seen in the context of the other powers that the Bill makes available to the Home Secretary—powers to set national plans, to direct new regulations, to prescribe the way in which individual officers and forces work and to intervene in the running of local police units at basic command level. The Minister will be aware of yesterday's written answer to me, which demonstrates that considerable micro-management of basic command units is already in place in respect of street crime. The wider context of the totality of powers must be taken into account. 
 I am particularly worried about the phrase ''maintenance of public confidence'' in lines 30 and 31. What is public confidence? Its lost will result in the suspension of a senior officer. Let us suppose that the Home Secretary loses confidence in a senior officer and makes his view public in a national newspaper. He might overtly criticise a chief constable based somewhere in the country. If the Home Secretary took that step—in my view, it would be erroneous and unprofessional—it would have the effect of reducing and eroding public confidence in the particular officer. In other words, the public at large would say that the Home Secretary made the criticism and there cannot be smoke without fire. Hence the Home Secretary could himself cause the loss of public confidence in a senior officer and then say, ''Lo and behold, confidence has been lost; this merits the suspension of the officer''. It is a circular process, made possible by the clause. 
 A police authority or the Secretary of State could also interpret loss of public confidence as the failure of 
 a chief constable to conduct his force operationally in an appropriate way. To return to an earlier example, if a chief officer sincerely believes that it is appropriate to undertake an experiment to turn a blind eye to personal users—not dealers—of cannabis, but other chief officers take a different view, it could be a matter on which the Home Secretary decides that he has lost confidence in the chief constable of that particular patch because he is not cracking down on the law. The Home Secretary might say that soft drugs are serious because they lead on to hard drugs—MPs have often argued that—and because the chief constable takes a different view operationally and wants to focus more on burglary, the Home Secretary might announce his loss of confidence in him. In other words, the Home Secretary could pass judgment on a chief constable's operational decision, leading to suspension. 
 The Minister might say that that is not his or his ministerial colleagues' intention in proposing the clause at all. I am happy to concede that: the Minister might well resile from it, but we have to assess the framing of legislation and the possibilities that flow from that. We are not in the business of second guessing or interpreting what individual Ministers might do today, let alone in 10 or 20 years' time. I contend that the Bill as drafted will allow the course of action that I have elucidated to be followed. 
 The test of public confidence is essentially subjective, and that worries me. If a chief constable or senior officer is guilty of a criminal act, presumably they can be tried and dealt with accordingly. If they are accused of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, it will at least involve Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in an examination of how a force is run. Will the Minister's police standards unit comment on that? 
 The test of public confidence is much more subjective and therefore arbitrary, and it should not be used as the basis of a suspension. There is also the issue of what happens when a chief officer is suspended. Let us say that the Home Secretary or the police authority decides that there is a lack of public confidence, or even that there is a prima facie case that a chief constable is being inefficient, and he is then suspended. Because the test of public confidence is written into the clause, the very fact that the chief officer has been suspended will automatically lead to an erosion of public confidence in him. 
 It may well be that an investigation clears the chief officer, and he may be found to have acted entirely properly. However, public confidence will have been eroded by the suspension and so the other test, which is in clause 30, will kick in. Perhaps the Minister will say that when an officer is wrongly suspended and subsequently reinstated, no further action will be taken, and that the Home Secretary and the police authority will defend that chief constable, notwithstanding the loss of public confidence in him. The matter is a minefield, or a hornet's nest, or some other metaphor that I can come up with if you wish me to, Mr. Griffiths. 
 The clause is not well worded. That is why the amendments that my colleague and I tabled seek to link any suspension to a 
''degree of alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness''.
 Those are words that the Minister and the Bill have used, and they are acceptable to the officials who drafted the legislation. It is a somewhat more—although not entirely—objective test than that of public confidence. If the Minister is not prepared to tie suspension to that, he is effectively saying that although there is no alleged inefficiency or ineffectiveness, the Secretary of State will be right to suspend a chief constable if public confidence has been eroded. That is an intolerable argument to pursue, and I hope that the Minister considers the amendments seriously.

Nick Hawkins: Conservative Members agree with the hon. Member for Lewes on the inelegance of the drafting. He is on to a rather good point; it would be helpful to have additional clarification. I do not propose to repeat what he said, but we will listen with great interest to whether the Minister has any plans to deal with the issue, if not in the way that the hon. Member for Lewes suggests, then through some Government amendments. The hon. Gentleman is right that if the matter is left as it is, there is great danger that there will be significant problems along the lines of those that he set out.

John Denham: I was not entirely clear whether the hon. Member for Lewes understood the way in which the clause works. I mean no disrespect, but I think that on occasion he did not. Towards the end of his remarks, he said that the Secretary of State would be able to suspend a chief officer even if there were no allegation of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. That is not in the Bill.
 The provisions quite clearly have a sequential effect, the first stage of which is that the police authority or the Secretary of State considers whether to exercise the powers requiring a chief officer to step down on the basis of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. In other words, before the powers in the clause to suspend can kick in, and before the future of the chief officer's career is brought into doubt, there has to be sufficient doubt about the effectiveness and efficiency with which the force is being managed. Certainly, the Secretary of State or the police authority would say whether they were seriously considering whether to exercise those powers. Given that a process is under way, how does one deal with the circumstances in which it is necessary to take additional action for the benefit of the force? The test of public confidence is clearly right. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness will be resolved through the processes that we discussed earlier, but the clause is about whether some earlier action to maintain public confidence is necessary. 
 It is right that a different test from that for efficiency and effectiveness will be considered on the basis of existing legislation and other clauses under the Bill. It is a high threshold. The Secretary of State or the police authority would have to decide that the maintenance of public confidence makes such a decision necessary. In effect, suspension must be 
 essential to maintain confidence. Such at test is not light. It removes the ability to use such powers willy-nilly. As with all such measures, the provisions are subject to administrative laws. I am describing circumstances in which either the police authority or the Secretary of State—or both—have thought it necessary to use the powers to require an officer to step down, retire or resign. The clause offers a way of dealing with that interim period.

Patrick Mercer: I endorse what the hon. Member for Lewes said. I had the opportunity at the weekend to speak to Stephen Green, the chief constable of Nottinghamshire. He commented on the powers and said that he had the gravest concern about the words ''maintenance of public confidence''. That officer has 30 years' experience and one of the sharpest minds in the constabulary. He is doing a wonderful job in Nottinghamshire. He said that that phrase was ''inexact, impossible to measure'' and may lead to the removal of an officer such as himself because of political convenience.

John Denham: I, too, have high regard for the chief constable of Nottinghamshire. I have spent time with him, examining various policing operations in and around the city of Nottingham. I can only restate that many people, when publicly discussing the Bill, have looked at the power of suspension as though it was completely unrelated to other measures in the Bill and as though the Secretary of State or the police authority could say, ''Something has happened. We do not like it very much. We will suspend you and then we shall think about what to do next.''
 The clause deals with the police authority or the Secretary of State 
''proposing to consider whether to exercise its power under subsection (2) to call upon the chief constable to retire or to resign''.
 That point must be reached before the suspension provision comes into play, and that has been missed in the public discussion. An arbitrary and subjective power to suspend would not be attractive to the Committee, nor is it what we are proposing. While the power to retire or resign should rest on the tests of inefficiency and effectiveness as it has done for a long time—although not qualified by legislation, none the less such tests must be met—the question of suspension should be properly judged in circumstances that take into account the maintenance of public confidence. The clause has been worded deliberately to set a high threshold. It does not say, for example, that the chief officer could be suspended because that may be beneficial for public confidence or because people would feel a little better about it.
Mr. Boris Johnson (Henley) rose—
Lady Hermon (North Down) rose—

John Denham: I give way to the hon. Lady.

Lady Hermon: The unhappiness about the present drafting is based on the word ''satisfied''. The Minister knows that it is extremely difficult to challenge that in judicial review, unless it is wholly unreasonable. Therefore, it would be much better if the clause were reworded so that it stated, for example, that,
''there were reasonable grounds for believing that the maintenance of public confidence in the Metropolitan police required suspension.''
 The concept of satisfaction is very hard to challenge in judicial review.

John Denham: The hon. Lady raises an interesting point but, as she understands, I cannot give a commitment with regard to it at present—despite the fact that the hon. Member for Lewes is urging me to do so—as I would wish to take advice on the matter. At first sight, I am unsure that, in practice, at judicial review a major difference would be produced by using the wording that the hon. Lady has suggested rather than the current wording. I will consider her proposal. However, looked at as a whole, the test has a high threshold, and one that the Secretary of State would need to be able to sustain. I now give way to the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson).

Boris Johnson: My question has been answered.

John Denham: I hope that I have responded to the points that have been raised. I will consider the hon. Lady's suggestion, but I do not wish to raise expectations that it might be successful on Report, because it is just a point that she has put to me in Committee.

Norman Baker: As always, I am grateful to the Minister for responding in detail. However, I have no reasonable grounds for thinking that I should be satisfied with his response.
 The hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) made a sensible suggestion, and I hope that the Minister will look at it. However, he has not really addressed the core issue, which is that the maintenance of public confidence is an arbitrary and subjective test and that, therefore it is, by definition, difficult to challenge. 
 The Minister also failed to address the point that, if a chief officer is suspended because somebody thinks that that is necessary for the maintenance of public confidence, that will have a prejudicial impact on the subsequent consideration of whether that officer should remain in post. When we debated an earlier amendment, the Minister ruled out involving independent parties in the consideration of an inquiry that is conducted under the auspices of the police authority, and now we face the possibility of the suspension of a chief officer because it is subjectively considered that public confidence has been eroded. 
 Under those circumstances, what chance would that officer have of an unbiased hearing, and what would be the relationship between those who thought that a suspension was appropriate, and those who subsequently discussed and decided whether that officer should retire or resign? The judging authorities are the police authority and the Home Secretary, so it seems to me that that is prejudicial, and it certainly creates a mood in the public mind, which it is then difficult to turn back. 
 The Minister has also failed to address the point that in the event that the somewhat drastic action was taken to suspend a chief officer for failing to maintain 
 public confidence—and if that is the reason, it should be stated—and that officer was miraculously cleared and it was decided to reinstate him, he would be placed in an almost intolerable situation, because he would be expected to carry on with his job knowing that the Home Secretary or the police authority had previously felt that public confidence in him was lacking.

Vera Baird: I am sorry to interrupt, but to be frank, the hon. Gentleman has failed to get the point of the Minister's reply—although it may be that I have misunderstood the matter.
 The decision to suspend due to a lack of public confidence would follow the police authority's decision to exercise its power to consider whether to dismiss someone. Therefore, it must have an initial apprehension that an officer is inefficient or ineffective before it considers whether the public has lost its confidence in him. In the light of a proposal to consider whether to ask him to resign, it might be in everyone's interest for him simply to stop performing his duties while the issues were considered, coldly and calmly. That is the key point. It might be in his interest to be taken out of duty while the issues were considered coldly and calmly. There would then be no difficulty about putting him back in. If the hon. Gentleman's test for suspending an officer that he were inefficient and ineffective, it would be difficult for him to go back in afterwards.

Norman Baker: I listened carefully to the hon. and learned Lady for whom have a great deal of respect in both this Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I also had respect for her predecessor, although that is probably not a popular thing to say in certain quarters of the Labour party these days.
 With respect to the hon. and learned Lady, I did not misunderstand the Minister's point. He made his case quite well, but I hope that he recognises that my response is valid and consequential, notwithstanding the sequential test that he set out. If an officer is suspended for reasons of maintenance of public confidence, he is suspended by people who will be judge or jury on whether he should lose his job. That prejudices such consideration. If the officer is reinstated, he will have to return to office in the full glare of publicity because he has been suspended, which has many implications. 
 I am worried about the issue. The clause is not properly worded, and there are dangers. Several Opposition Members have made suggestions for improvement or raised concerns. I hope that the Minister will reflect on those. If he does not accept the amendment today, I hope that he recognises that the amendment and my comments have been well intentioned and reflect a genuine worry about the clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 - Removal etc. of senior officers at the instance of the Secretary of State

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Vera Baird: Subsection 2(2A) requires that if the Secretary of State gives notice to an officer that he shall exercise his power and provides a written explanation of his grounds, a copy of the notice should be sent to the police authority as well as the officer. However, there is no requirement for a copy of the grounds to be sent to the authority. Was that requirement deliberately left out? Does the Minister believe that it would be sensible to send the authority not only the notice, but the reasons for proposing to act? That would allow everybody to know what everybody else is doing.

Norman Baker: The hon. and learned Lady made an interesting contribution that raises a valid point. I shall make a small contribution to allow the Minister to find a reason to refuse her suggestion.
 I might be the only member of the Committee with my point of view, given the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole. I am worried about the concept of the clause. The Minister will say that it largely replicates the 1996 Act and, in several ways, improves on it. However, I would have voted against the provisions in the 1996 Act had I had been in the House at the time, and I am not encouraged by the fact that they have not been watered down in the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: Can the hon. Gentleman enlighten those of us who follow with interest the question of whether the Liberal Democrats are being consistent? Although the hon. Gentleman was not in the House in 1996, did any Liberal Democrat Member vote against the powers in the 1996 Act?

Norman Baker: If I could shed some light on that, I would be accused of spending too much time reading old bits of Hansard for enjoyment. I leave this place in the evening, so I cannot shed any light on that. However, I am sure that whatever was said, probably by my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), was absolutely correct and well argued—probably at some length. I am able to say that with some confidence without knowing what he said.
 I am concerned by the concept of the Secretary of State having the ability to remove a senior officer, most notably a chief constable. I do not know whether it has ever been exercised. I am sorry to refer to him again, but we saw the case of Paul Whitehouse in Sussex, who was removed not by section 42 of the Police Act 1996, but by press release. Notification appeared in the daily newspapers that the Home Secretary had lost confidence in him. What happens when a Secretary of State actively dislikes a chief constable or his or her operational practices? I recognise that this is not a new power, but I am uncomfortable with giving an absolute power to the Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be.

Ian Lucas: Is it not better to set out the full procedure by which the Secretary of State can initiate the termination of employment of a chief constable, rather than having a situation in which his job is ended by a press release? The Bill contains the formal procedure.

Norman Baker: If that is the choice, the answer is yes. However, there was that choice with Paul Whitehouse and the formal procedure route was not chosen. The Government went down the press release route, which was regrettable.
 If a chief constable is to be dismissed, should not the police authority do it? I would not object to the Home Secretary being involved—there could be a requirement for consultation or an opportunity for input. However, it is a safeguard in our tripartite system for the chief constable not to be subject to dismissal at the whim of the Secretary of State. It is also a defence for the Secretary of State, because he or she could be subject to allegations of political interference when action had been taken for good reason. The actions of the Secretary of State may be justified when examined coldly, but the opportunity is there to allege to the public, who may not be party to the full details, that the decision was political. 
 I do not think that my view will gain much support, but I wanted to put it on record because this is one step too far. It could open the door to allegations of politicisation and be unfair to the Secretary of State, who may be put in that position after being advised to take a particular course of action.

John Denham: The hon. Gentleman needs to stop chucking around phrases such as ''getting rid of chief constables at the whim of the Secretary of State''. That is a grossly irresponsible way of referring to legislation that has existed not since 1996, but since 1964. If what he said were true, we would have seen Secretaries of State of all persuasions exercising whims. We need proper objective discussion of the legislation, not stuff that plays to some outside gallery or a conspiratorial political agenda.
 Many of the hon. Gentleman's contributions in Committee have been enormously constructive, and he has highlighted important issues. I would not accuse him of taking an irresponsible approach throughout, but it is important to make it clear that the Secretary of State cannot get rid of chief constables at whim, under either this Bill or the Act it replaces. 
 Like Governments since 1964, I believe that placing absolute reliance on police authorities to get such decisions right is a step too far in the tripartite structure. In the interests of the service as a whole, the Secretary of State must have the power to take action, which is what the Bill will give. There must be a proper balance of power. Had the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) been in the Chair, I would have referred more directly to a television discussion in which the right hon. Lady and I took part a few months ago. She branded the Government as far too wimpish on these matters, and said that the whole point about New York was that its governor had sacked police commissioners at whim until he had got the one that he wanted. She takes a 
 robust approach on these matters. That is not the Government's approach, but it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to intervene as circumstances require. 
 My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar raised an important point. Until she drew attention to the draft legislation, I understood that it would include grounds as well as the notice. We may need to return to the matter on Report to tidy it up.

Norman Baker: I hope that you will forgive me for responding to the Minister on this occasion, Mr. Griffiths, but I do not want to let his remarks pass without doing so.
 I assure the Minister that I am not ''playing to the gallery'', to use his phrase. He moves to impugn my motives. He may think me entirely wrong, but I assure him that my intentions in raising my point were honourable and reflect my concerns about the clause and the way in which the legislation was framed in the past. I have issued no press release on that, and as far as I am aware, there are no press here. I have no intention of communicating my point beyond this Room, but I hope that the Minister will know from my activities in this House that if I want to communicate something to the press, I am quite capable of doing so. I ask him to accept that my comments were honest and that I had no ulterior motive in framing them as I did. 
 I do not accept the Minister's view. He does not accept mine, although it is not only mine: I refer him to the concern that my colleagues Lady Harris and Lord Dholakia expressed in another place about the terms of the clause. The Minister may not recognise the fundamental difference of philosophy between us, although I hope that he now does. I understand his view that it is important for the Secretary of State to have the reserve power to initiate the removal of a chief officer. No doubt it would be used only in extenuating and adverse circumstances, but my colleagues and I believe that it is—to use his phrase—one step too far in the opposite direction, for the reasons that I gave. Notwithstanding the complications that it may cause, the power is best left with police authorities. The Minister and I will disagree on that, but I ask him to accept that my view is honest, and is conveyed to the Committee with the best of intentions.

Lady Hermon: I, too, appreciated the intervention of the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. Does the hon. Member for Lewes accept that we are trying to ensure that the officer concerned truly has a fair hearing and that the rules of natural justice are complied with? The Secretary of State should surely be bound to send not only the notice and the explanation of the grounds, but the response of the officer who has been given the opportunity to make representation to the metropolitan police authority or other police authority?

Norman Baker: The hon. Lady makes an important point, which I hope the Minister has duly noted. Perhaps the experience of Northern Ireland can be useful to our deliberations.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32 - Regulations concerning procedure for removal of senior officers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Denham: The clause provides a new power to make regulations relating to procedural matters that we discussed under clauses 28 to 31. I wanted to highlight to the Committee that the previous legislation did not provide for regulations to be made, so the details of procedures to be followed under the Bill would be completely unwritten and unregulated, and that is unsatisfactory. I hope that the clause will be viewed as a step forward. Before making regulations under part 3 procedures, the Secretary of State will be required to consult representatives of the interests of police authorities, chief police officers and any other persons whom he thinks fit. As I said earlier, we will discuss the procedural requirements with CPOSA and establish the extent to which they should form part of the statutory regulations.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34 - Conduct of disciplinary proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I have a couple of points about clause 34. If we had seen it earlier, one of these might have led my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and myself to table amendments. We received a briefing from the Police Federation, but unfortunately I saw it for the first time only yesterday evening, which was far too late to table any amendments. The Minister and his advisers may be aware of it. I also seek the Minister's clarification on a problem that I noticed myself.
 Let me start with the Police Federation's worries. It is concerned and suspicious about the use of the phrase 
''or otherwise participate or intervene in''.
 The provision confers a right on the new IPCC and on 
''persons as may be specified''
 to 
''participate in, or to be present at, disciplinary proceedings''.
 The Police Federation is concerned that that might be 
''a rather underhand way of enabling disciplinary proceedings to be made open to the public.''
 If the Minister assures us that that is not what the statute means and that the Government have no intention of allowing these matters to be open to the public, we can rely on the Pepper v. Hart ruling in future cases. However, I share the Police Federation's 
 concern that police disciplinary proceedings should be no different from in-house disciplinary proceedings in other occupations where the senior manager is the discipline officer. 
 Having made inquiries in other sectors, the Police Federation could find no parallel example of such in-house disciplinary proceedings being open to the public. In-house disciplinary proceedings are different from employment tribunals or other public tribunals of professional bodies such as the General Medical Council. I sympathise with the Police Federation because, in a previous incarnation before entering the House in 1992, I had responsibility as a corporate lawyer for conducting some in-house disciplinary matters. I am well aware that, within companies and other bodies, such matters are normally confidential in the first instance. Only later might someone take the matter to an employment tribunal so that it then became public. 
 I said in connection with an earlier clause that matters before an employment tribunal are not always fairly portrayed by the media, which can lead to other concerns. If the Police Federation's suspicions are right that the clause will allow the whole matter to become public, the media might report all the allegations but, if the disciplinary proceedings lead to an acquittal because the complaint was unfounded, the other side might never be reported, as often happens with controversial employment tribunals. In the case to which I referred earlier, huge publicity was given to the allegations against a manager in a subsidiary company of the group for whom I was group legal adviser, but when the case was found to be completely inaccurate and the tribunal comprehensively rejected the allegations, there was no publicity at all. The viewing public and those who read newspapers were given the impression that all the allegations were true, because they were never countered. 
 We are talking about maintaining public confidence, and clearly if that happened to police officers, it would be a huge concern. The Police Federation's interpretation is that that could be a result of the way in which clause 34 is drafted. I hope that the Minister will say that that is not the intention, but we shall hear in a moment. 
 The Police Federation's other serious concern about the drafting of the clause relates to the ability of the IPCC to ''bring and conduct'' disciplinary proceedings. There are concerns that the same body may have the power 
''both to investigate and to prosecute disciplinary matters.''
 The federation rightly refers to what the royal commission on criminal procedure said in 1981, which has been said by many public bodies down the years. It said that 
''it is . . . unsatisfactory that the person who has investigated the case should be the person responsible for the decision to prosecute''.
 Down the years, many bodies have said that the investigation and prosecution should be in separate hands. 
 The Police Federation raised those two concerns. My concern when I initially read the clause was that there might be an opportunity for another body that 
 normally has nothing to do with the police or police discipline to say under the terms of the clause that it has the right to come along and take part in the court proceedings. In recent years and other contexts, we have seen that a body such as the Consumers Association might try to come to the court and say, ''We have locus standi—we have the right to be heard on this matter.'' 
 I hope once again that the Minister will reassure us by saying that the clause will not allow any other body—be it the Consumers Association, the Commission for Racial Equality or any other quango or single-issue lobby group—to intervene in what should be an in-house private procedure. I do not want clause 34 to act as a sort of ''open sesame'' provision and allow vast numbers of bodies to intervene in in-house police disciplinary proceedings. The Minister is shaking his head, which I hope means he will reassure us, but I have at least raised the concerns of the Police Federation and of my hon. Friends and I.

John Denham: Let me deal with those three points in talking about the clause as a whole. Obviously, getting right the handling of disciplinary proceedings is a vital element in ensuring that the public have confidence in the police and the police complaints procedure. That is why the clause extends the Secretary of State's regulation-making powers. One effect of the regulations will be to give the IPCC a more active role in disciplinary proceedings, which relates to the hon. Gentleman's second point.
 The complainant and the general public must be confident that evidence at a hearing will be presented fully and robustly. We have sought to address the concern that has arisen in the past that a case might not be presented robustly, particularly at an internal disciplinary hearing such as may currently follow a recommendation from the Police Complaints Authority. In particular, concerns might arise in future on occasions when the IPCC has already had to direct the appropriate authority to bring certain disciplinary proceedings against an officer because it had not previously agreed to do so. In those circumstances, it might be appropriate for the IPCC to attend and, if necessary, present the case itself or instruct counsel to ensure that the case against the officer is presented robustly. 
 I understand the issue raised by the hon. Gentleman, but it is necessary to maintain public confidence in the system as a whole. The clause allows regulations to be made that will have a significant role in achieving that. They will also update the procedures regarding persons who can attend disciplinary proceedings. 
 To take the hon. Gentleman's third point, it is not part of our intention that the provision should be an open door to any lobby or interest group that comes along and says that it wants to be part of the process, but we think that up to three supporters of the complainant should be able to attend disciplinary hearings. The presiding officer may decide in special circumstances that more can attend the hearing, and will of course be expected to be even-handed in the treatment of the officer facing the charge. 
 I shall mention a point not raised by the hon. Gentleman. In order to meet a recommendation from the Select Committee on Home Affairs, the clause enables regulations to provide for inferences to be drawn from failure on the part of a charged officer to mention any relevant facts. That will bring the police conduct regulations in line with those in criminal proceedings, to which a change was made after the passing of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 The hon. Gentleman's first issue was whether there should be a possibility of public access or public disciplinary hearings. He invited me to rule that out, but I regret to say that—as I think the Police Federation of England and Wales is aware—I cannot do that in the absolute terms that he asks for. I understand the point that he makes about media reporting. There are other types of hearing that can be harmful to a person's reputation, such as those of the General Medical Council, with which I am familiar from my previous position as a Health Minister. 
 The fact that someone is cleared on the seventh day does not usually get the same prominence in the press as the evidence dragged up in the first six. We all understand the strength of the hon. Gentleman's point and the concerns that have been expressed by the Police Federation. However, we have had extensive consultation on the issue. 
 There are strong feelings on both sides. On the one hand, there is an argument for openness and the importance of having some access to the disciplinary hearings in order to maintain public confidence that issues have been properly pursued. On the other hand, there is the matter of police confidence in the system. There is also the argument that the hon. Gentleman put so well, which is that the public should not be admitted to what is essentially a management exercise. Of course, it must be remembered that three quarters of disciplinary hearings are not the result of public complaint in any case. 
 Taking into account all those arguments and the need to maintain public confidence, it is our view that, in certain exceptional cases, the option of a public hearing should be available. We would not want to make that routine practice, but there are certain circumstances in which, for a variety of reasons, there is a case for allowing public access in order to show that a matter has been fully and properly pursued. We intend the regulations to cover those exceptional cases. That is not the answer that the hon. Gentleman invited me to give, but I hope that I have at least given him a clear and straightforward answer about what we intend to do and how the regulations would be framed.

Boris Johnson: I wonder whether the Minister could give us a taster of the circumstances in which the public might be admitted.

John Denham: An example is a case in which there had been high-profile public concern that a member of the public had been seriously and wrongly injured by police action. The necessary procedures might have
 been gone through and, for a variety of reasons, it might be inappropriate to bring a criminal action, which would normally be the preferred course if someone had broken law. If there had been concern to ensure that the circumstances of the case had been properly examined, and the IPCC concluded that there had been a breach of the disciplinary code, it might be appropriate to have a public hearing to avoid allegations that an incident in which a member of the public had been seriously harmed had in some way been covered up.
 Despite the reservations about media coverage that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath raised, under those circumstances it could be better for the reputation of an officer to have been cleared through a process that had clearly been carried out properly, and that people had seen reported, than for someone to have been cleared in an entirely private hearing with the inevitable allegations and suspicions that it was a ''police cover up''.

Norman Baker: I listened to the Minister carefully and I agree with him. However, sometimes the hearings are private and sometimes they are public, so the decision whether the hearings are private or public needs to be objective and set down clearly in regulations. Such decisions must be defensible. They cannot be seen to be the result of media pressure or an approach of a particular Minister.

John Denham: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. It is something that we shall need to deal with not in the Bill, but when drafting the regulations that the clause enables us to do. I defend the idea that issues of public confidence are of necessity or, by definition, high profile cases, so I cannot rule out the level of public interest as being a factor. I agree that the regulations will need to set out a clear basis on which decision are taken.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister has characteristically made an extremely thorough response, for which I am grateful. It is helpful to know that only in exceptional cases will there be media reporting or public access of the sort that would lead to media reporting. I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman knows from experience that the Government and those who advise them are conscious of situations in which lurid allegations are reported for six days, yet the fact that the person is acquitted on the seventh day receives no coverage and the public are left with the impression that the allegations were true. I am glad that his comments will be on the record.
 I am somewhat less happy, however, with the Minister's response to our concerns and those of the Police Federation about the IPCC both bringing and conducting the disciplinary proceedings. I hope that he will continue to discuss that with his officials because there may be a better way in which to proceed. We may have to return to that issue on Report. As for my worry about other bodies being given an ''open sesame'' to the disciplinary proceedings, I was reassured by what the Minister said. It was helpful that he did not anticipate single-issue lobby groups or quangos having a right to interfere. He gave us some 
 valuable new information when he said that he envisages that the guidelines will say specifically that there could be up to three supporters of the complainant. That detailed response suggests that the Minister may already have some draft guidelines in his ''if pressed'' notes. I see that the Minister is putting his head in his hands, but if there were some guidelines—even if they are at an early draft stage—it would be helpful to see them. I hope that the three supporters are individuals, not bodies. As always, his response has been helpful. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 - Police powers for police authority employees

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 94, in page 34, line 6, at beginning insert 'Subject to subsection (11),'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 140, in page 34, line 6, at beginning insert—
 'Subject to subsections (9A) to (9H) below,'.
 No. 141, in page 34, line 15, at beginning insert— 
 'Subject to subsections (9A) to (9H) below,'.
 No. 142, in page 35, line 13, at end insert— 
'(9A) Before exercising his powers under this section, a chief officer of police of any police force or a Director General must submit to the police authority maintaining that force (the relevant police authority) or, as the case may be, the Service Authority a draft scheme (a ''designation scheme'') setting out— 
 (a) the purpose of the proposed designation scheme relating to the designation of persons under this section and the expected benefits for the policing of the area; 
 (b) how the designation scheme contributes to the 3 year strategy issued by the authority under section 6A of the Police Act 1996 and the local policing plan issued by the authority under section 8 of that Act or in the case of a Service Authority how the scheme contributes to the Service Plan issued by that authority under section 4 or section 50 of the Police Act 1997; 
 (c) the extent and nature of the powers he proposes to confer on designated persons; 
 (d) how the suitability and capability of persons to be designated under the scheme will be assessed; 
 (e) the arrangements for the provision of training to such designated persons; 
 (f) the arrangements for the provision of equipment to such designated persons and any health and safety implications of the proposals; and 
 (g) an estimate of the direct and ancillary costs of the scheme to the police fund kept by the police authority or, as the case may be, the service fund kept by the Service Authority. 
 (9B) The Chief Officer or Director General shall not exercise his powers under this section until the relevant police authority or Service Authority has approved a designation scheme for this purpose. 
 (9C) Before approving any scheme, or any modified or revised scheme, which differs from the draft scheme submitted by the chief officer or Director General, the relevant police authority or Service Authority shall consult the chief officer or Director General. 
 (9D) Before approving any such scheme, a police authority shall consider any views obtained by the authority in accordance with arrangements made under section 96 of the Police Act 1996. 
 (9E) Before approving any such scheme, a Service Authority shall consider any views obtained by it in accordance with arrangements made under sections 41 or 85 of the Police Act 1997. 
 (9F) The chief officer or Director General may from time to time submit to the relevant police authority or Service Authority a revised or modified scheme for its consideration. 
 (9G) After a scheme has been approved by the relevant police authority or Service Authority, the chief officer or Director General shall bring into force. 
 (9H) It shall be the responsibility of the relevant police authority or Service Authority which has approved any scheme under subsection (9B) above to undertake a full review of the workings of the scheme 12 months after it has come into force and in particular to— 
 (a) seek the views of the principal local authority for the area; and 
 (b) monitor the impact of the scheme on public confidence in the force maintained by that authority.'.
 No. 98, in page 35, line 25, at end insert— 
'(11) Any proposals by the chief officer of police under this section must have been included in his annual policing plan and have been approved by his police authority.'.

Nick Hawkins: This group contains two amendments tabled my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and I, and three amendments that were tabled by the hon. Member for Lewes. Our two amendments run very much together, the most crucial one of which is amendment No. 98. That proposes a new subsection (11). We hope that the Minister will accept it, because it is vital that whatever is put forward is discussed and agreed by the police authority, and is part of its annual plan. I am sure that he will not be unsympathetic to the spirit of our proposal, even he cannot accept its exact words.
 It would be lovely to imagine that, if the Minister cannot accept our amendment, he may introduce a similar amendment on Report. It would strengthen the clause's detailed provisions. It is difficult to understand why specifying that in the Bill would be a problem. Amendment No. 94 simply states that everything in the clause must be subject to proposed subsection (11). 
 The hon. Member for Lewes will speak to the Liberal Democrat amendments in a moment. I entirely understand the intention behind his proposals, but we shall listen with interest to his description of the background to them.

Norman Baker: As the hon. Gentleman correctly predicted, I intend to speak to the amendments tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole. I am sure that the Minister recognises that the introduction of designated persons who exercise police powers on the streets and the extension of the number of people in police stations who can do so represents a fundamental change in the nature and style of local policing.
 The amendments have three aims. The first is to ensure that, before replacing police officers with designated persons, the chief officer prepares a proper strategy for their use, training, equipment and the costs involved so that all the implications of such a step are fully thought through. 
 The second is to ensure that such a step is taken only with the approval of the local police authority 
 following consultation with the local community—that is only right, as it is that community's police area, force and authority—and relevant local authorities, bearing in mind the requirement to work closely with local authorities, which the Government have properly recognised with local crime and disorder partnerships, which have been a significant step forward. The third aim is for the impact on community confidence of the use of designated officers to be properly monitored and reviewed fully after a year. 
 The amendments may seem complex, but I hope that their purpose is simple—to put in place safeguards that my hon. Friend and I believe are lacking in the Bill. The decision whether to designate a particular member of police support staff and what power to give that person is an operational one for the chief constable. That is a point that I might be expected to make and is consistent with my other comments. I am delighted that the Minister agrees. I was also delighted when the Home Secretary, in response to Home Office questions, recently declined the invitation to comment on particular activities in one part of London, for those reasons. I am pleased to say that the concept of operational independence is still well respected. However, the principle of whether to have community support officers on the streets and the strategic oversight of such initiatives are properly the business of the police authority. 
 Most Committee members will have read the briefings on the Bill produced by the Association of Police Authorities, which make the point forcefully. The Metropolitan police and their Commissioner strongly back the Government's proposals for community support officers. Indeed, they seem so keen to do so that they have taken action to introduce CSOs before the Bill comes into force, albeit without the powers provided in the Bill. However, the Government have not yet produced much evidence to show that the public want quasi-police officers on the streets, rather than real ones. When I go around knocking on doors or talking to people in the street, they tell me that they want more bobbies on the beat. They do not want second-rate police officers, plastic police men or whatever else they might be called, as substitutes for police officers. The community view is important. It is a key element of the amendment. 
 If we are to have community support officers with the powers that the Home Secretary wants to give as part of his proposals in the Bill, like regular police officers, they will need the support and confidence of local people to proceed. That will be a key element that determines whether they succeed and whether the concept of CSOs is accepted by the public. Therefore, local accountability and approval is key to this part of the Bill, and to our entire policing system. 
 However, such confidence or consent will not be secured if local communities feel that they are being fobbed off because they consider that CSOs are a way of providing policing on the cheap. Therefore, they will need to be fully involved in decision-making, and to sign up to the concept that I think that the Government want to promote, which is that CSOs are 
 a support to police officers, rather than a replacement for them. There is doubt about whether that is the case: the Minister is aware of the genuine concerns of police officers, for example, that CSOs are a way of providing alternatives to them—in other words, that they will allow for a reduction in the number of police officers, rather than an extra tier on top of the existing number, or, hopefully, on top of increased numbers. 
 I hope that Committee members agree that local people should have a say in whether CSOs should police their neighbourhoods and what powers they should have, and that the decision should not simply be—as appears to be the case in clause 35—one which can be taken quickly, succinctly and without such deep consultation and involvement being necessary. Consultation with the community is the responsibility of the local police authority, under section 96 of the Police Act 1996. Therefore, police authorities will wish to consult with local people and other key partners before they decide whether to give approval to the use of CSOs. 
 The Bill sidesteps the huge range of issues that needs to be addressed before police powers can be given to support staff and the community can reach a conclusion about whether it is appropriate for CSOs to be deployed in its area. That is the reason for the comprehensive—I hope that it is not too exhaustive—list that is set out in amendment No. 142, in particular. That gives an indication of the sorts of tests and requirements that we would require before the decision to proceed could be taken. I am sure that any chief officer or police authority will want to have a clear, fully worked-out strategy as to what these officers will be used for, and how they will be trained, equipped, and so forth. 
 It would simply be common sense and good management practice to adopt the sorts of proposals that are included in this amendment. It is intended to ensure that the police authority and police force have properly developed plans to show how CSOs, and other designated staff, will contribute to better policing in the area, and what the costs of that will be. The amendment is intended to buy public confidence and support—it is intended to get people to buy into the Government's project. 
 The Minister might refer to clause 36. If he does so, he will see that clause 36(4)(d) states that the chief officer must set out in the policing plan details of how the provisions in clause 35 have been used. That is all that it does. It is not a replacement or an adequate substitute for amendment No. 142—and for amendments Nos. 140 and 141, which are necessary precursors to it. There is no requirement in clause 36(4)(d) for the chief officer to get the police authority's prior approval to consult local people, or to have a properly worked-out strategy. Therefore, it could all be a fait accompli that is merely recorded in the plan after the event, in which case there would be no say for the police authority, or for local people, in a fundamental change in policing in their area. There would be no safeguards of the sort that I have set down in amendment No. 142. 
 The Minister might say that no chief constable would embark on the process without gaining the 
 support of the local police authority and, perhaps, the local authority and maybe even the local community. However, that is not how the Bill reads. A chief constable might be wholly sold on the idea of community support officers but his police authority might not share that enthusiasm. 
 Without the requirement to go through the process and safeguards that are set out in the amendment, the Bill opens the way for the chief constable to have an unfortunate disagreement with the police authority after the decision to use CSOs rather than before. That would not be good for local policing, police morale or the local community. Notwithstanding my unhappiness with the powers that are given to CSOs, which I have addressed in other amendments, I allow for the fact that if the Bill is enacted, they will be employed. I want to ensure that if that happens, CSOs will be introduced and used in a way that commands proper support from the police authority, the community at large and all other people or bodies that might have an input, such as local authorities. I am trying to help the Government to ensure that the Bill works rather than causing problems after its implementation. That is the spirit in which I moved amendments Nos. 140, 141 and 142, and I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on them. If he does not do that, I hope that he will not accuse me of playing to the Gallery for moving them in the way that I did—there is no one in the Gallery in any case. 
 Amendments Nos. 94 and 98 have some force and common sense behind them. They are not absolutely essential but they would improve the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on them. They are a less detailed way of securing the same ends that I have described. They would tie the activities of the chief officer into the local community and the police authority by the use of the annual policing plan. It would be wholly unobjectionable and uncontroversial to proceed in that way. 
 It is clear that the Bill does not contain the tie-in that the Conservative amendments set out briefly or the detailed tie-in set out in the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole. A tie-in should be explicitly present.

John Denham: One would hardly know that the hon. Gentleman is the person who, addressing the House of Commons on 8 March 2002, said:
''The Liberal Democrats are happy with, and will support, the concept of CSOs—indeed, we included such a provision in our last manifesto.''—[Official Report, 8 March 2002; Vol. 381, c. 560.]
 This group of amendments is not the worst that he has moved in an attempt to wreck the entire concept of CSOs—we shall come to worse in later sittings. One would hardly have thought that such enthusiasm was that of a political party that claimed to include the concept of CSOs in its manifesto. Perhaps, in due course, we will find out where the Liberal Democrats stand—

James Paice: This week.

John Denham: Yes, I could hardly ask for more than knowing where the Liberal Democrats stand this week.
 Knowing where they stand next week would be asking too much.
 The question of whether the operational decision for chief constables on the designation of staff should be subject to the prior approval of the police authority is at the heart of the amendments. The amendment would give the decision a status that does not apply to other operational decisions by chief constables. For example, I am sure that the decision to switch traffic police in London from traffic policing duties to the street crime initiative was discussed with the Metropolitan police authority but not subject to its approval. That significant switch of roles was the responsibility of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. We must recognise that it would be a major step of principle to say that operational decisions should be subject to prior approval by the police authority. Although amendments Nos. 94 and 98 are somewhat more ambiguously worded, that is what I take to be the intent of this series of amendments. 
 Of course, we are all happy with the idea that there should be proper consultation between the chief constable and the police authority—and, indeed, at a wider level, between the police authority and the community—about a policing strategy. However, there is already a mechanism for doing so that is supported in the Bill, and that is that consultation should take place between the chief constable and the police authority about the draft policing plan, and that discussions should take place in the wider community. That is clearly the vehicle by which a range of issues, including the development of CSOs and their future deployment, should properly be discussed. That is a different principle from saying that the set of procedures should be subject to prior approval by the police authority. 
 Clause 36 already requires that plans to designate support staff under schedule (4), or to set up a community safety accreditation scheme, should be set out in the annual policing plan, and that drafts of that document should, as they are now, be submitted by the chief officer to the police authority. I believe that the annual policing plan is the best way to undertake the consultation. It is a local plan adopted and published by the police authority before the beginning of each financial year. The process for producing it is well established; the chief officer prepares the drafts and submits it to the police authority. If the police authority disagrees with the draft plan, it cannot publish a version that differs from it without first consulting the chief officer on the proposed modification. 
 With regard to the more detailed amendment No. 142, clause 40 allows us to set out a code of practice for the exercise and performance of the chief officer's duties under chapter 1. I am sure that consultation with stakeholders will be required before extending police powers to civilians. The issue comes down to an important point of principle about whether the police authority should have prior approval for the development of CSOs. I would resist that suggestion on the grounds that I would resist many other specific 
 policing operational matters being made subject to the veto of the police authority. 
 Of course, consultation with the police authority and the wider community on the procedures that we already have is highly desirable. Indeed, I believe that police constables will regard consultation with the police authority as absolutely necessary. We know that the chief commissioner in London took great care to ensure that the Metropolitan police authority was fully behind him when he was developing the CSO scheme. That is a different matter from saying that prior approval should be required, and that is what I take the amendments to mean.

Norman Baker: As always, I am grateful to the Minister for his response. Without deviating too far from the amendment, I should like to say that the Liberal Democrat position on CSOs is abundantly clear, as Ministers frequently say of the Government's position in response to questions put to them from across the Dispatch Box. We have always supported the concept of CSOs, and did so at the last election. However, we disagree with the Government significantly on the powers that they should have for reasons that I shall explain under later amendments.
 There is harmony on this side of the Committee between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, but I urge the hon. Member for Surrey Heath not to chortle when inconsistencies over CSOs are alleged. The wholesome opposition to CSOs put forward by Conservative Members contrasted markedly with the statement made by the shadow Home Secretary, who said that the Conservatives had always supported CSOs. That went by without notice on Second Reading. 
 I understand exactly why the Minister takes the view that he does. The matter is finely balanced. I am the first to defend the operational independence of chief constables and I do not want the police authority or anyone else to be involved in day-to-day activities. However, the decision to employ such people for the first time is a matter about which chief constables should have more say than perhaps the Home Secretary and the Minister may envisage. After all, a fundamental change is being made to the nature of policing. 
 I would have said the same about the employment of traffic wardens some years ago. Whether or not a chief constable wanted that to happen should have been subject to approval. When such people are approved, they are for the chief constable to deploy. Such a significant change is so fundamental to the policing of our country that it is not right to leave it in one person's hands. No chief constable will act in the teeth of opposition from the police authority—at least, I hope not. The Minister is right that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was 
 assiduous in making sure that he had support from the Metropolitan police authority before he took the action that he did. That is how a chief officer should behave. However, it is possible for a chief officer to be unwise in the way that he or she proceeds and my amendment would avoid that. 
 The Minister did not respond to the need not only for the decision to be up to the chief constable or the police authority, but for local authorities, for example, to be included. They will work together in crime and disorder partnerships. That is important, given the powers that CSOs are to be given, if the Minister has his way. The wider community must feel that it supports CSOs rather than have them forced upon it, which was another matter with which the Minister did not deal. I am pleased that he recognised the need for a code of practice. That goes some way towards meeting the aims of my amendments. It is not up to me to withdraw them because the lead amendment was tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. However, I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I hope that he understands why I tabled the amendments.

Nick Hawkins: I certainly do not want to go into some of the wider issues that will be raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire when we discuss the next amendment. If I were to respond in tremendous detail to what the hon. Member for Lewes said, I would be trespassing on that territory. Suffice it to say that we understand his suggestions. We have also listened carefully to the Minister. We gained the impression that, while there are great worries that the Home Secretary may be wanting the opportunity to micro-manage, the Minister's response was that we cannot have a police authority that micro-manages. That seemed the wrong way round. The hon. Member for Lewes, my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and I share the belief that, if anyone is to undertake pre-clearance or micro-managing, it is better that it should be the police authority at local level than the Home Secretary of whichever political persuasion in the future. We shall refer to that general worry when discussing other parts of the clause.
 I understand the Minister's response to our amendments. We do not resile from the fact that it would be helpful to have such issues in the policing plan. It may be a matter to which we shall have to return, but I do not want to detain the Committee on the amendments, because we shall have more lengthy debates on subsequent groups. At this stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Further consideration adjourned—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at seventeen minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 20 June at half-past Nine o'clock.